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399 
FREE SPEECH AND AUTONOMY: 
THINKERS, STORYTELLERS, AND A 
SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO SPEECH 
Susan H. Williams* 
Ed’s and Seana’s papers together present a powerful 
argument for the idea that autonomy is a fundamental value 
underlying the protection of free speech. As I have written 
elsewhere, I agree with this argument.1 In this response to their 
papers, I would like to suggest that an autonomy approach 
focused on narrative rather than choice as the vehicle for 
autonomy offers some advantages. First, I will outline briefly the 
functions served by autonomy that provide a foundation for this 
value in our moral and political experience. Second, I will offer a 
narrative model of autonomy and describe how it serves the 
functions in our moral and political lives for which we need 
autonomy. Third, I will highlight the two primary advantages of 
this model: (1) seeing autonomy as an ongoing process rather 
than an assumed starting point, and (2) focusing our attention on 
systems of free speech—rather than only on individuals, whether 
they are speakers, listeners, or thinkers. I believe that this focus 
on systemic concerns is crucial to rethinking the commitment to 
free speech in a way that makes issues of inequality central and 
therefore holds the promise of making free speech a living and 
meaningful part of people’s experience. 
 
 *  Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law and Director, Center for Constitutional 
Democracy at Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Thanks to all of the 
participants in the free speech theory group for the engaging conversation and to Jim 
Weinstein for organizing the group and keeping us moving along. And I would like to 
take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to Ed Baker for his kind 
encouragement to me over the years and for the brilliance, integrity, and sincerity of his 
scholarship, which have inspired all of us.  
 1. See generally SUSAN H. WILLIAMS, TRUTH, AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH: 
FEMINIST THEORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2004) (offering an approach to the 
first amendment based on a reconceptualization of truth and autonomy as the 
fundamental values and democracy as a particularly important application of both 
values). 
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I. THE FUNCTIONS OF AUTONOMY AND A 
NARRATIVE MODEL THAT SERVES THEM2 
An autonomy theory needs grounding: it needs to explain 
the source of the particular version of autonomy that it is using, 
and that source needs to provide a basis for believing that this 
autonomy value is fundamental in a way that explains its 
constitutional status. For Ed, the source is a particular 
understanding of the respect that a government must show its 
citizens in order to legitimately demand their obedience to its 
laws.3 For Seana, the source is the collection of capacities—
rational, emotional, perceptual, and sentient—that “correctly 
constitute the core of what we value about ourselves” and that 
together constitute “the individual mind and the autonomy of its 
operation.”4 I take a more functionalist and relational approach 
that focuses on social practices. In order to know what autonomy 
means and why it matters, I begin by asking what is the work 
that we want and need the concept of autonomy to do in our 
moral and political lives? If those functions are of fundamental 
importance to us—as I believe they are—then we have both an 
explanation of the importance of autonomy and a framework for 
assessing a particular concept of autonomy to see if it can fulfill 
these functions. 
I believe that there are at least four primary functions 
served by the concept of autonomy in our moral and political 
lives. These functions are fundamental in the sense that, if we 
did not have a concept of autonomy that could effectively do 
these things, we would both find our moral lives deeply 
disrupted and lose moral and political practices of great value to 
us. All of these functions are described in terms of social 
practices and the value of those practices runs both to the 
individuals involved in them in any given instance and to all 
members of the societies that can sustain them.5 
The first function of autonomy is to ground a collection of 
attitudes towards ourselves, including self-trust and self-respect. 
Self-trust is the ability and inclination to rely upon oneself, even 
 
 2. The first two sections of this paper are a short summary of the argument I 
develop in greater detail in TRUTH, AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH. See id. at 130–72. 
 3. See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 
251 (2011) [hereinafter Baker, Autonomy]. 
 4. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 285, 287 (2011). 
 5. Or, as Tim describes them in his comment, “bystanders.” See Tim Scanlon, 
Comment on Shiffrin’s Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 327, 331 (2011). 
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if it leads to vulnerability. Self-respect is the belief that one is 
worthwhile as a person and the disposition to act on that belief 
by, for example, resisting violations of one’s rights, being 
committed to one’s own projects and values, and maintaining 
one’s personal standards.6 Both of these attitudes allow us to 
experience ourselves as agents and not merely as objects of our 
own observation. Without self-trust and self-respect, we would 
be incapable of forming and working to implement plans. I 
assume that the value of this orientation toward ourselves is 
obvious enough to need little argument.7 
These valuable attitudes toward ourselves are dependent 
upon a concept of autonomy. If one experienced oneself as the 
unwilling and helpless pawn of forces beyond one’s control, with 
no capacity for self-direction, then it would be impossible to 
trust oneself.8 Similarly, the projects of self-respect—resisting 
violations of rights, developing and being committed to one’s 
own values, and maintaining personal standards9—are possible 
only if we see ourselves as agents capable of some meaningful 
self-direction. So, whatever our view of the world and the issues 
of causal determinism when we adopt the perspective of an 
“observer,”10 we must also have available to us the perspective of 
the autonomous, that is, self-directing, agent.11 Allowing us 
access to that perspective is one of the important functions of a 
concept of autonomy that any acceptable version must fulfill. 
The perspective of the autonomous agent is also crucial to 
our understanding of character and the possibility of integrity. 
Character is a collection of personality traits, attitudes, and 
values held by an individual that is relatively stable over time. 
Character ties a life together, allowing us to see ourselves and 
others as more than simply arbitrary collections of behaviors and 
experiences. Owen Flanagan describes soldiers suffering from an 
identity crisis who were observed by Erik Erikson as follows: 
[T]hey normally experience themselves as the locus of a set of 
subjectively linked events, as a sort of conduit . . . What they 
lack . . . is any sense of coherent and authoritative “me-ness,” 
 
 6. See DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE 210–13 (1989). 
 7. See Robin S. Dillon, How to Lose Your Self-Respect, 29 AM. PHIL. Q. 125, 134–
35 (1992). 
 8. See KEITH LEHRER, SELF-TRUST 96 (1997). 
 9. See Dillon, supra note 7, at 134. 
 10. See Susan Wendell, Oppression and Victimization: Choice and Responsibility in 
“NAGGING” QUESTIONS: FEMINIST ETHICS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 57–66 (Dana E. 
Bushnell ed., 1995). 
 11. See Richard Fallon, Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 893 (1994). 
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of personal sameness—any sense that these subjectively 
linked events occurring to and in them constitute a person, a 
self, a life.12 
For these soldiers, there is not a complete breakdown of the 
boundaries of personal identity: they are aware when an act or 
emotion happens to them rather than to someone else. The 
problem is that they cannot see why the simple fact of the 
location of that act or emotion in them makes it theirs in any 
meaningful sense. They have lost a sense of authorship or 
autonomy. This sense of autonomous agency is the glue that 
holds together the disparate elements of a life into a single 
person with a coherent character. 
Autonomy is also central to our understandings of moral 
responsibility. In the voluminous literature on responsibility, 
there is a general consensus that responsibility rests on 
autonomy.13 Indeed, rather than arguing for the connection, it is 
usually assumed and marshaled in support of one or another 
conception of autonomy (as providing better support for the 
practices of responsibility). If we think of the ascription of 
responsibility as a social practice, then it has at least two 
purposes: one purpose is to attempt to change people’s behavior 
in the future and a second purpose is to establish, maintain and 
repair the relationships of trust on which the moral community is 
based. In both of these purposes, the practice of ascribing 
responsibility relies upon a concept of autonomy. 
The most obvious purpose of ascribing responsibility is to 
shape people’s behavior in the future. The person held 
responsible for a bad act will, we hope, reflect and decide 
differently the next time.14 And, of course, the practice of 
holding people responsible shapes the behavior of other actors 
who are aware of it as well. One need not adopt a contra-causal 
notion of freedom to make sense of this purpose, but one does 
need a basic concept of autonomy. It may not matter whether 
the agent could have done differently in the past, but she must 
have some capacity for decision-making and self-direction in 
 
 12. Owen Flanagan, Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation, in IDENTITY, 
CHARACTER, AND MORALITY: ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 48 (Owen Flanagan & 
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty eds., 1990). 
 13. PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 95 (2002). 
 14. See MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF 
COMMUNITY: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW 182 
(1992). 
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response to the community’s norms in order for the ascription of 
responsibility to affect her future behavior.15 
The second purpose of the social practice of ascribing 
responsibility is to establish, maintain, and repair the 
relationships of trust on which the moral community is based. In 
order to live together, we must be able to trust each other, in 
general, not to violate the shared norms of our community. The 
practice of ascribing responsibility allows the victim of a 
violation of that trust to register her hurt and outrage and to 
assert the fundamental relationship of obligation between 
herself, the agent of the violation, and the community.16 As with 
self-trust, however, this is possible only if the agent in whom 
trust is placed is seen as autonomous. Without a minimum 
degree of self-direction, an agent can’t be trusted.17 Thus, both of 
the central purposes of ascriptions of responsibility rest on a 
concept of autonomy.18 
Finally, autonomy (understood as self-direction), is an 
important part of how we understand the possibility of social 
change and the meaning of politics. Obviously, if we are the 
helpless products of our social conditioning, we cannot hope to 
be the conscious agents of social change. Change may come, and 
it may even come through us, but it will not be under our 
direction unless we have some authorship of our own actions. 
Political movement and democratic politics, in particular, would 
make little sense in a world without autonomy. Or, to put it in 
the way that Ed has so persuasively argued the point, much of 
the reason that democratic politics has value for us is that it 
represents both an exercise of and respect for our autonomy.19 
This is the overlapping consensus that Jim sees between Ed’s 
autonomy theory and democracy theories.20 
 
 15. See id. at 235–37. 
 16. See MARGARET URBAN WALKER, MORAL UNDERSTANDINGS: A FEMINIST 
STUDY IN ETHICS 95 (1998). 
 17. Of course, autonomy, while necessary, is not sufficient for trust. We might not 
trust an autonomous person whom we believed to be malicious, for example. 
 18. The relationship between responsibility and autonomy is dialectical: the support 
and dependence runs in both directions. For a discussion of the ways in which our 
practices of ascribing responsibility support a concept of autonomy, see WILLIAMS, supra 
note 1, at 141–42.  
 19. See Baker, supra note 3, at 265. 
 20. See James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political Legitimacy: A Response to Ed 
Baker, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 366 (2011). 
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II. A NARRATIVE MODEL OF AUTONOMY 
I suggest that a model of autonomy in which the central 
activity is interpretive rather than volitional can serve these 
important purposes while providing some crucial advantages 
over a choice based model like Ed’s. Seana’s “thinker” is not as 
focused on choice as the central activity; indeed, her approach 
includes significant cognitive, perceptual, and emotional aspects 
that suggest that she is combining autonomy with elements that I 
have argued could be understood through a reconceptualized 
truth theory of speech.21 Because I believe that blending 
elements of epistemology and moral/political theory is necessary 
to capture many of our deepest concerns, I am very sympathetic 
to the move, implicit in Seana’s model, to bring both types of 
elements together in a metaphor like the thinker.22 As a result, 
the contrast to choice based theories in my description below is 
intended to apply more to Ed’s approach than to Seana’s. In the 
next section, where I will explain the primary advantages of a 
narrative model, I will highlight the ones that are relevant to 
Seana as well as to Ed. 
I intend to use the category of narrative in a very broad and 
inclusive way. In particular, I do not intend to limit narrative to 
stories as conventionally understood. Instead, I am using 
narrative to point to a broader category of activities in which a 
person “orders a sequence of events [or, I would add, people or 
things or concepts] for the purpose of revealing or creating 
meaning.”23 A narrative model of autonomy identifies the central 
focus of autonomy not as an act of choice, but as an act of 
interpretation: the primary experience and exercise of autonomy 
takes place when we make meaning. While “telling our own 
stories” is a useful heuristic device to capture this idea, we 
should not let the metaphor mislead us: many types of speech 
make meaning in this way without taking the form of a 
traditional story with plot or characters. The point is to focus not 
 
 21. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 95–129, 175–98. 
 22. See id. at 116–17. Indeed, Seana’s wonderful paper is causing me to reconsider 
whether there is a single model or metaphor that can capture both of the sets of concerns 
that I discuss in the book under truth and autonomy headings. Such unity would be 
desirable for all the reasons she outlines and I think it might be possible that the thinker 
could serve such a function, but, in order to address the concerns raised in this paper, the 
model would need to be recast in more process-based and system-focused directions. 
 23. Hilde Lindemann Nelson, Resistance and Insubordination, 10 HYPATIA 23, 27 
(1995). Because I am using narrative so broadly, my view of storytelling may come very 
close to Seana’s view of thinking, which also involves a very broad range of cognitive and 
emotional faculties.  
!!WILLIAMS-272-FREESPEECHANDAUTONOMY3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:39 AM 
2011] THINKERS AND STORYTELLERS 405 
 
on these formal elements of storytelling, but on the central 
project of interpretation and meaning making, rather than on 
choice. The goal of autonomy in this model is that one’s identity 
and life are not “the object or medium of someone else’s speech, 
[but rather] the subject of one’s own.”24 
One obvious question raised by this narrative model of 
autonomy is whether it has any role for action. In other words, if 
I can tell my own story but am subject to restraints that prevent 
me from acting on it, am I still autonomous? In answer to this 
question, I think it is useful to distinguish between freedom and 
autonomy. Freedom requires not only that I be autonomous in 
the sense described here, but also that I experience negative 
liberty (some degree of freedom from constraints on my action) 
and also often positive liberty (some degree of support for the 
resources, capacities, and opportunities necessary for my action). 
Issues related to action (other than interpretive, meaning-
making actions) are best understood as raising these concerns of 
negative and positive liberty, which are, of course, the subject of 
many other legal protections, constitutional and statutory. 
Autonomy is one necessary, but not sufficient, element of 
freedom. One might, then, be autonomous but in many ways 
unfree, because of such limitations on negative or positive 
liberty.25 This approach facilitates the important work of 
recognizing the autonomy that can be and often is exercised by 
people under conditions of oppression. Even when their 
freedom of action is drastically and unjustly curtailed, people can 
and do exercise the autonomy to tell their own stories and make 
their own meanings.26 
This process of narrative autonomy is fundamentally 
relational. First, the model is substantively relational: the 
content or substance of the categories we use in telling our 
stories—the understandings of character, the familiar plot lines, 
the narrative techniques—are part of our cultural inheritance 
and are given to us through our social relations rather than 
created ex nihilo by us individually. Second, the model is 
causally relational: the capacities we use in the process of telling 
our stories are the product of certain social relationships and 
require such relations to sustain them. So, as many writers have 
recognized, both rationality and imagination are capacities that 
 
 24. Susan J. Brison, The Uses of Narrative in the Aftermath of Violence, in ON 
FEMINIST ETHICS AND POLITICS 214 (Claudia Card ed., 1999). 
 25. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 145–46. 
 26. See id. at 80.  
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are learned, developed and sustained by social relationships.27 
Indeed, as Seana points out, isolating a person can lead to the 
loss of a whole range of such capacities, sometimes to the point 
of insanity.28 Finally, a narrative model of autonomy is inherently 
relational: narrative (unlike choice) assumes a relational context. 
It is not that one cannot tell a story alone, but (1) the normal 
assumption is that stories are told to someone; (2) the exceptions 
to this norm often confirm it by positing an imaginary audience; 
and (3) even when the only audience is ourselves, we tend to 
replicate the social aspect by thinking of ourselves as separated 
into the part telling the story and the part hearing it. In other 
words, a narrative model builds a relational element into the 
concept of autonomy. 
This narrative model can serve all of the purposes of 
autonomy identified above. Moreover, it offers some interesting 
and potentially helpful insights into the nature of the various 
moral and political practices in which autonomy plays a part. For 
example, the basic self-trust and self-respect that we need to 
take an internal view of our own action can be grounded on the 
self-direction that we experience through the process of creative 
reinterpretation of our stories. Because symbolic systems always 
include the possibility for reinterpretation and transformation, 
our retellings are never fated to be simply parroting back what 
we were given: they always include the possibility of creativity, 
that is, of a conscious reworking of culturally given materials in 
light of our normative commitments. Because we have access to 
this form of agency (regardless of the truth or falsity of causal 
determinism on some other level), we are never simply the 
passive recipients of forces beyond our control. As a result, self-
trust and self-respect are both possible and desirable. 
Nonetheless, the relational elements of the model remind us 
that our autonomy is always partial: we can be the authors of our 
own stories, but we are never the only authors. In addition, our 
capacity for self-direction is itself a product of social relations 
and conditions often beyond our individual control. Thus, our 
autonomy is also always contingent. As a result, our self-trust 
and self-respect are consistent with both humility and 
interdependence—indeed, require them. We need others to help 
 
 27. See ANNETTE BAIER, POSTURES OF THE MIND: ESSAYS ON MIND AND 
MORALS 83–90 (1985) (describing us as “second persons” because we are created 
through these relations.) 
 28. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 305. 
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create and sustain in us the capacity for self-direction on which 
our self-trust and self-respect depend. 
Character also is supported by a narrative model of 
autonomy: the process through which we claim our own 
characters, and discern those of other people, is fundamentally 
narrative. Again, however, a narrative model highlights the 
relational nature of our characters and, as a result, their fluidity 
and vulnerability to social conditions. We construct and 
reconstruct our own characters and that of others through a 
dialogue with other people. But the conditions of this dialogue 
are not the same for everyone and systems of social hierarchy 
and oppression are therefore relevant to our capacity for 
narrative autonomy: “we are not all in the same discursive 
positions any more than we are all in the same social ones. . . . 
There are moral problems with the social distribution of 
narrative resources and the credibility to use them.”29 
A narrative model of autonomy also serves the function of 
supporting our system of ascribing responsibility. The two 
primary purposes of this system, I suggested above, are to affect 
people’s future behavior and to establish and maintain 
relationships of trust on which communities depend. The 
narrative model suggests that when a message of praise or blame 
is communicated to someone, two things happen: first, the agent 
is presented with certain information which she must assess in 
terms of, and perhaps incorporate into, her stories about herself 
and, second, the agent must respond to the effect of the 
ascription of responsibility on her relationships with her dialogic 
partners within the moral community. Again, the crucial 
question raised by this understanding of autonomy is: what are 
the conditions that help or hinder the agent in her efforts to 
exercise her powers of creative interpretation in carrying out 
these tasks? 
Finally, a narrative model of autonomy also provides a 
meaningful basis for our practices of democratic politics. As is 
probably apparent, a narrative model of autonomy provides 
support for a dialogic model of democracy. Because our 
autonomous identities are created through a process of dialogue 
with others, it is a mistake to see our interests and values as 
endogenous to politics. Moreover, political interaction is one of 
the important realms in which we engage in building narrative 
 
 29. WALKER, supra note 16, at 106–07. 
!!WILLIAMS-272-FREESPEECHANDAUTONOMY3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:39 AM 
408 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:399 
 
autonomy.30 The goal of politics is not to preserve a pre-existing 
sphere of individual autonomy, but to provide the types of 
interaction that constitute one part of our autonomy.31 
Given that the model of autonomy proposed here is 
narrative, it is probably not necessary to go into great detail 
about how it is related to speech. So, I will just point out that 
there are two primary ways in which speech is related to 
narrative autonomy. First, many speech acts would themselves be 
exercises of narrative autonomy: telling one’s story in the broadest 
sense. Second, the systems of speech (such as the structure of 
broadcasting markets or the financing of political campaigns) 
affect the possibility of autonomy for many people. Such systems 
can have two different types of effects: (1) increasing or 
decreasing the opportunities for the exercise of narrative 
autonomy, and (2) facilitating or hindering the development of 
the capacities needed for narrative autonomy. Speech is 
uniquely significant to the exercise of narrative autonomy (at 
both the individual and collective levels) because it is through 
the manipulation of symbolic systems that we create meaning, 
engage in interpretation, and communicate, which are the basic 
components of narrative. On the other hand, speech is not 
uniquely significant to the development of the capacities for 
autonomy. I will pursue this distinction a little further in the next 
section, when I explore a few of the implications of a narrative 
approach for specific speech issues. 
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF A NARRATIVE MODEL 
I believe that this narrative model has two primary 
advantages over more traditional autonomy theories. First, the 
narrative model sees autonomy as an on-going process rather 
than as a pre-existing capacity, and that shifts the analysis in 
ways that are useful for avoiding some of the pitfalls of 
traditional autonomy theories. Second, the narrative model 
focuses our attention on the social conditions that facilitate or 
frustrate the development and exercise of autonomy. It forces us 
to consider whether our systems of speech are helping or 
hindering that autonomy and not only whether they are 
 
 30. See generally IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2000) 
(developing a theory of communicative democracy). 
 31. This need not be the only goal of politics, of course: politics might also serve 
utilitarian purposes of promoting the general welfare or, as Vincent Blasi has suggested, 
building certain character traits in citizens. But this understanding of democratic politics 
does have implications for these other purposes. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 170. 
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frustrating its expression in a particular case. As a result, it 
makes considerations of inequality central to the concerns of the 
first amendment. 
The first advantage of a narrative model is that, in this 
model, autonomy is neither a preexisting condition that can be 
assumed for all persons (as I believe it is for both Ed and 
Seana)32 nor is it an end state that can be taken for granted once 
achieved.33 It is, instead, a process that must be continually 
ongoing for a person to be autonomous. Autonomy can, 
therefore, exist to different degrees and in different areas of 
one’s life.34 
There are several useful results of this shift to 
understanding autonomy as a process. First, when autonomy is 
seen not as an achievement or a precondition, but as an ongoing 
and always imperfect process, then we have a much better way 
of approaching the difficult issues raised by persons whose 
capacities are less developed. 35 Children or adults with mental 
disabilities, who may have reduced capacity for rational 
reflection compared to average adults, have, for that reason, 
often been seen as less autonomous and, therefore, less 
deserving of the rights due to autonomous persons. Women have 
 
 32. See Baker, supra note 3, at 254 (formal conception of autonomy “consists of a 
person’s authority (or right) to make decisions about herself”). Given Ed’s conviction 
that the basis for governmental legitimacy rests on respect for autonomy, it must be the 
case that autonomy has to be assumed by the government as (at least) a starting point for 
all normal, adult persons. For Seana, the issue is somewhat less clear. Her paper suggests 
a similarly ascriptive role for autonomy. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 287 (“I will proceed 
from the assumption that, for the most part, we are individual human agents with 
significant . . . capacities . . . I will also assume that our possession and exercise of these 
capacities correctly constitute the core of what we value about ourselves.”). Nonetheless, 
I think that Seana’s focus on capacities opens the window for her to move in the direction 
I am outlining here: seeing autonomy as a process rather than an assumed starting point 
and paying attention to the social conditions necessary to develop and maintain those 
capacities. I just don’t know whether she is interested in jumping out that particular 
window or not. 
 33. As it appears to be for some other, liberal autonomy theorists. See, e.g., 
ALFRED R. MELE, AUTONOMOUS AGENTS: FROM SELF-CONTROL TO AUTONOMY 228–
29 (1995) (describing the process of becoming autonomous in terms of the development 
of certain cognitive and motor skills). 
 34. Choice does not disappear from our experience in this model. Moments of 
choice are often the catalyst for telling or retelling our stories and choices are among the 
more important consequences of telling a particular story in a particular way. But choice 
is unique neither as the occasion for narrative autonomy (e.g. think about unchosen 
changes like the death of a loved one that cause a retelling of our stories) nor as the 
consequence of narrative autonomy (both forms of knowledge and relationships—not 
always experienced as chosen—are other common consequences of retelling our stories). 
See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 149–50. 
 35. I am grateful to Jill Hasday for raising this issue in her helpful comments on this 
paper. 
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sometimes been categorized the same way.36 But from the 
perspective of a narrative model of autonomy, all persons’ 
autonomy is partial, episodic, and imperfect. The issue is not to 
find some baseline of autonomy to mark out the persons who are 
autonomous enough to deserve rights. A narrative model does 
not divide people into categories of autonomous and non-
autonomous on this basis or for this purpose. Instead, a narrative 
model suggests that the central issue is to think about the 
barriers and limitations that restrict autonomy for various 
persons and to work to provide people with the opportunities 
and resources necessary to increase their autonomy. In other 
words, the question in any given case is not whether such 
persons are currently autonomous enough to demand rights, but 
how to structure their rights so as to facilitate their autonomy. 
Children or people with developmental limitations may need 
rights that function differently to facilitate their autonomy than 
average adults. But no one is categorically excluded and the 
question for all persons is essentially the same. 
Another important consequence of thinking of autonomy as 
a process rather than as a starting point is that it shifts our focus 
from the theoretical questions about free will and determinism 
that have plagued traditional theories of autonomy,37 to the 
practical questions about the conditions necessary to support our 
experience of this process. Rather than struggling to explain 
exactly what sort of freedom from causal determinism is 
necessary to make autonomy work and how exactly that type or 
degree of freedom is possible, we can focus on the experience of 
being able or unable to tell our stories and the conditions that 
frustrate or facilitate this process. 
This problem with seeing autonomy as a starting point is 
part of the reason that both Ed and Seana are led to what I 
believe to be an ultimately dissatisfying explanation for the 
limited First Amendment protection for commercial speech. 
Thinking of autonomy as a starting point to be generally 
assumed leads them to try to explain limited protection for 
commercial speech by pointing to conditions of coercion that 
 
 36. See Diana T. Meyers, The Socialized Individual and Individual Autonomy, in 
WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 145 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987). 
 37. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL 27 (John Christman 
ed., 1989); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988); 
ROBERT YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY: BEYOND NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY 
(1986). 
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take it out of the category of autonomous speech.38 If autonomy 
is assumed as the normal starting point, then some argument like 
this appears to be necessary to explain why a particular category 
of speech is not deserving of protection. The problem, which 
both Ed and Seana have recognized and struggled with here, is 
that many forms of speech are subject to a vast range of types 
and amounts of coercion.39 We all operate under such pressures 
constantly, and they interact in ways that are complex and highly 
individual in determining the range of choices open to us. There 
is no reason to believe that the pressures of the market on 
commercial speech are different either in kind or degree from 
the pressures experienced by other speakers in a host of 
situations in which we all agree their speech should be protected 
(e.g., religious organizations in which members are pressured to 
speak on behalf of the group’s beliefs). Some people obviously 
do engage in commercial speech that reflects their values, and 
other people engage in non-commercial forms of speech that are 
more a response to social pressures than a reflection of their own 
values. Thinking of autonomy as a precondition for speech 
protection puts us in the untenable position of trying to draw a 
line to mark the area of speech that is autonomous enough to 
qualify for First Amendment protection. 
Thinking of autonomy not as a given but as a process—and, 
in particular, as a process that is both dependent upon and 
actualized within social relationships—leads to a different focus. 
From the perspective of narrative autonomy, it is not the 
breadth or narrowness of choice left open by social pressures 
(market-driven or otherwise) that determines whether speech is 
protected. The central question is, instead, whether the speech 
systems surrounding commercial speech allow and encourage 
people to develop and exercise the range of capacities involved 
in telling their own stories. In other words, the issue is not 
whether commercial speech is sufficiently autonomous to be 
deserving of First Amendment respect; the issue is whether the 
commercial speech system is sufficiently protective of narrative 
autonomy. 
This question would lead us to a set of different 
considerations with respect to commercial speech. In thinking 
about the speaker, we might ask whether the social safety net in 
 
 38. See C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 
981, 985–94 (2009); Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 296. 
 39. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 296–97 (recognizing the limits of these 
arguments but reiterating the basic point). 
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our society is sufficient to allow people some meaningful 
opportunity to express their creativity at the risk of losing their 
jobs. We might ask about the ways of encouraging corporate 
cultures that nurture creativity. And we might ask about the 
structure of a market that could incorporate the pursuit of values 
in addition to profit. In terms of the listeners, we might ask 
about the impact of advertising on our capacities for reflection 
and our sense of self-worth. We might think about the potential 
for creative resistance to such effects and the ways in which 
speech systems might facilitate such resistance. I am not 
suggesting that any one (or even all) of these concerns would 
lead us to the conclusion that commercial speech is unprotected. 
Rather, they might lead us to the conclusion that certain kinds of 
government efforts to improve this speech system by altering 
underlying conditions, even at some cost to current speech, do 
not violate the First Amendment. 
The point is to focus not on whether a particular example of 
speech represents a sufficient exercise of autonomy to qualify for 
protection, but instead on whether the existing speech systems 
facilitate and encourage autonomy. That, after all, is the real 
problem. Denying First Amendment protection to commercial 
speech does not begin to address these underlying systemic 
issues, it simply makes them easier to ignore by blunting some of 
the social costs they impose. A model that focuses on autonomy 
as a process rather than a pre-existing state directs our attention 
to these more significant systemic concerns that shape our 
capacities for autonomy. 
This point leads me to the second advantage of a narrative 
model: the general focus on systems. It is because a narrative 
model makes social relations so central to autonomy—causally 
and conceptually—that it leads to this focus on the background 
and systemic conditions that are so often overlooked by other 
autonomy theories.40 In thinking about the protection for speech 
 
 40. Both Ed and Seana include important relational elements that distinguish their 
approaches to autonomy from much of the traditional literature. For example, Ed 
focuses not only on self-expression but also on participation in social change as a central 
element of autonomy, see C. Edwin Baker, The Scope of the First Amendment Freedom 
of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 991 (1978), and Seana emphasizes the ways in which 
relationships with others are crucial to the faculties she identifies as fundamental to 
autonomy. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 284–85. But neither of them focuses attention on 
the relationships in which the capacities for autonomy are created and maintained as a 
concern of first amendment analysis. Again, the point is not to make such conditions 
themselves violations of the first amendment but rather to suggest that government 
action directed to addressing such conditions should be seen as contributing to the 
purposes of the first amendment even if it causes some interference with speech that is 
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as serving the goal of protecting autonomy, we must pay 
attention to the systems of social relations that facilitate the 
development and maintenance of the capacities necessary for 
autonomy. 
I need to pause here to make clear that this systemic 
approach is not equivalent to a focus on what Ed calls 
“substantive equality” in his contribution to this exchange. He 
defines substantive autonomy as a person’s “capacity to pursue 
successfully the life she endorses.”41 This he contrasts with the 
formal autonomy he is endorsing, which “consists of a person’s 
authority (or right) to make decisions about herself—her own 
meaningful actions and usually her use of her resources—as long 
as her actions do not block others’ similar authority or rights.”42 
As I understand it, this distinction points to the difference 
between choice, which is the heart of formal autonomy, and 
action, which is the focus of substantive autonomy. So, when a 
critic of formal equality complains that there is not much point 
in a model of autonomy that protects a person’s right to choose 
to be a lawyer if she has no realistic possibility of getting the 
training or opportunity to actually be one, that critic is relying on 
a substantive conception of autonomy. 
A narrative model of autonomy is, however, not a 
substantive one in Ed’s sense. A narrative model focuses on the 
ability to tell one’s own story, but it does not address the ability 
to make that story a practical reality through action in the world. 
The latter ability is also crucial, but is best understood as liberty 
(both positive and negative) and is, as Ed points out with respect 
to substantive autonomy, inherently and inescapably partial.43 
The more important of such liberties are the subject of other 
constitutional protections and, like Seana, I think it is a strength 
of autonomy theories that they are able to offer a coherent 
account of how freedom of speech is related to, and 
interdependent with, other fundamental rights, such as privacy.44 
Although narrative autonomy is not substantive in Ed’s 
sense, there is a similarity between narrative autonomy and 
 
generated by the current, problematic systems of expression. 
 41. Baker, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 253. 
 42. Id. at 254. 
 43. See id; see also text accompanying notes 24–26 (arguing that freedom is best 
understood as the combination of autonomy, negative liberty, and positive liberty.) 
 44. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 288; WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 204–05 (arguing 
that the first amendment should, therefore, be understood to have implications for our 
interpretation of other constitutional provisions). 
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substantive autonomy: both focus on the conditions in the world 
that are necessary to support the exercise of autonomy. In the 
case of narrative autonomy, there are two sets of such 
conditions: those social relations that provide the foundation for 
the various capacities needed to tell one’s own story and those 
that allow the practice of such telling to flourish. The systems 
that help develop (or retard the development of) our capacities 
are, of course, much wider than speech systems. Certainly, an 
economic system that generates vast disparities in wealth is at 
least as important in affecting the potential for many people to 
develop capacities for autonomy as any system of speech. The 
First Amendment cannot directly address such non-speech 
systems, but the values underlying freedom of speech may have 
implications for the interpretation of other parts of the 
Constitution.45 Nonetheless, while other systems have a large 
impact, speech systems are the primary mode through which 
narrative autonomy is practiced and one of the primary modes 
through which the capacities necessary for narrative autonomy 
are developed and sustained. The educational system, the mass 
media, the internet, political campaigns, the system of 
government funding for speech, the rules governing the use of 
government property for speech purposes—these are all 
examples of speech systems. The protection for freedom of 
speech should be understood as protection for the health and 
good functioning of such systems rather than only as protection 
for individual rights. 
This shift in focus allows us to seriously consider some of 
the kinds of problems current speech doctrine has difficulty even 
recognizing: the ways in which systems of speech restrict the 
opportunities for narrative autonomy for groups of people even 
if they do not violate the rights of any particular individual. I 
have offered elsewhere an extended argument for the conclusion 
that attention to the systemic issues in political campaign finance 
regulation demonstrates that such regulations should be allowed 
when they have the purpose and effect of increasing the ability 
of the system to promote narrative autonomy, even if they 
involve some cost to speech produced under the current 
problematic system.46 
 
 45. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 222 (arguing that protection of narrative 
autonomy might lead us to conclude that property-tax based school systems violate the 
equal protection clause). 
 46. Id. at 210–21. 
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Similarly, a concern for the health of speech systems would 
lead to a rule that government action that has as its purpose the 
restriction of narrative autonomy should be suspect whether or 
not any particular person’s opportunity to speak has been 
limited by that action.47 This approach would suggest, for 
example that, regardless of whether a government funding 
program for speech involves a “penalty” or merely a “refusal to 
subsidize,” the program is unconstitutional if its purpose is to 
restrict the ability of persons to engage in narrative autonomy. 
Thus, the crucial issue in Rust v. Sullivan,48 in which the 
government prohibited family planning programs receiving 
federal funds from providing counseling regarding abortion, is 
actually about the autonomy of the women rather than about the 
autonomy of the family planning clinics whose speech was 
directly affected. The problem here is primarily a problem about 
the government’s purpose in regulating this speech system, 
rather than about the impact on the speaker. The government’s 
purpose in this case was not just to refuse government funding 
for abortions (which is not a First Amendment violation, what-
ever its status under the Fourteenth Amendment), but to limit 
the information women received in such programs in ways that 
would make it more difficult for them to decide to have 
abortions, regardless of the source of funding for the procedure. 
In other words, the government’s purpose was precisely to 
restrict the autonomy of the women and, as such, it should have 
been unconstitutional regardless of whether the program 
involved a penalty or a refusal to subsidize.49 This understanding 
of Rust is consistent, I believe, with the deep sense of moral 
outrage that the case inspires, which is based not on the impact 
on the doctors who were silenced, but on the impact on the 
women whose autonomy was deliberately reduced by the 
government action. 
 
 47. This insight represents the kernel of truth at the heart of the anti-paternalism 
argument the Court often relies upon. See, e.g., 44 Liqourmart, Inc.v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484 
(1996) (striking down a law prohibiting alcohol price advertisements). 
 48. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 49. The focus in current doctrine on whether the government has created a public 
forum might persist, since the obligations on the government in a public forum go well 
beyond the minimal restriction discussed here. But even in the absence of a public forum, 
this limitation on purpose should apply.  
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CONCLUSION 
In short, I agree with Ed and Seana that autonomy is a 
central value protected by freedom of speech and that it 
provides an important basis for the First Amendment. And, like 
them, I believe that we need a clear statement of the nature of 
autonomy and the reasons why it is so important in order to 
understand the nature of the legal protections that are necessary 
to sustain it. But I also believe that the conception of autonomy 
we should be using is one that makes human relations and social 
systems central to our analysis. Adopting this approach to 
autonomy allows us to see autonomy as a process rather than an 
assumed starting point and thereby avoids the problematic issues 
raised by refusing protection to speech that is deeply shaped by 
social (including market) influences. In addition, this approach 
refocuses our attention on the issues of inequality that prevent 
our speech systems from providing meaningful opportunities for 
autonomy to significant groups of people. Issues of inequality 
have been important to some democracy theories, but they have 
traditionally been less significant for autonomy theory because 
of its focus on choice, its failure to recognize the relationality of 
autonomy, and its assumption that autonomy is a starting point 
to be assumed for all. Bringing a concern for inequality into the 
center of autonomy theory is, I believe, one of the more 
important tasks of free speech theory. 
 
